Protecting Information Rights – Advancing Information Policy

Phone iconCONTACT US: 1300 363 992
 

Types

Topic(s): Health | Use
 

P v Various Entities [2004] PrivCmrA 12

document icon pdf (94.36 KB)


Case Citation: P v Various Entities [2004] PrivCmrA 12

Subject Heading: Improper use of personal information / declined to investigate on the basis that the complaint was lacking in substance

Law:National Privacy Principle 2 - Use Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and section 41(1)(d) Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)

Facts: The complainant lodged a complaint about various medical treatments whilst undergoing medical care and the way the media and other professional bodies had been dealing with him.

Issues: National Privacy Principle (NPP) 2 sets out the general principle that an organisation must only use or disclose personal information for the primary purpose of collection. Use and disclosure for a secondary purpose is not allowed except where such use or disclosure falls within the exceptions listed in NPP 2.

On initial presentation of the complaint, the facts were unclear and the respondents were unknown, hence it was unclear which entities had improperly used the complainant's personal information. Further telephone follow up with the complainant failed to reveal privacy issues involving specified respondents. As there was no specific respondent, the Office could not open an investigation. However, the Office provided the complainant with information about the Victorian Privacy Commissioner's jurisdiction and that of the Office of the Health Services Commissioner, because these bodies appeared to be more relevant in the circumstances.

Outcome: Section 41(1)(d) of the Privacy Act provides the Commissioner with a discretion to decline to investigate a complaint where the complaint is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance. The complaint was found to be lacking in substance since it was unclear who had allegedly misused the complainant's personal information. Accordingly the complaint was closed under section 41(1)(d) of the Privacy Act on the basis that the circumstances described by the complainant were lacking in substance.

OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER June 2004